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Tax Effects on the Value of Incentive Stock
Options (ISOs) and the Decision to Go Public
Thomas A. Rhee

The incentive stock options (ISOs) are similar to the regular stock call options.
However, when one considers various taxing laws regarding the ISO stocks, the
ISOs have unique features differentiated from the regular stock call options. In
general, no income from ISOs is realized, for tax purposes, either upon the grant
or exercise of the ISOs, until the ISO stock is actually sold. This poses an
interesting question to executives with ISOs about when the firm should go public.
In fact, a significant wealth can accrue to executives with the ISO stocks, when
the firm’s stock becomes publicly traded. Therefore, any changes in the tax law
may affect the financial value of ISOs and also the firm’s decision to go public.
The present paper examines the valuation process of the ISOs and investigates
the economic effects of tax law changes on “going public.” The result suggests
that the 1986 TRA may have delayed the firm’s decision to go public, while the
U.S. Administration’s recent individual income tax hike to finance the govern
ment deficit may somewhat encourage the firm’s activity to go public.

I.

INTRODUCTION

There are several reasons why a firm may want to go public. The first and an
obvious reason is that a firm can raise equity capital in the public market place. The
firm being publicly traded, the existing shareholders now have an additional
financial asset, which can be used as a means of payment and can be converted into
cash. There are also other reasons why firms do go public. The search cost of finding
a buyer of the firm’s equity interest is saved as a public company. On the other hand,
the firm’s sudden ability to raise capital in the equity market as a public entity also
helps increase the firm’s borrowing capacity in the debt market as well. However,
one of the most important reasons for firms going public is to retain and attract
qualified professionals who often demand additional incentive stock options as a
form of the company’s deferred compensation.* Many professional managers
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realize the full value of the incentive stock options (ISOs) once the firm is publicly
traded.
The value of ISOs is often affected by changes in the tax law. To the extent that
a reduced (or increased) value of ISOs affects the wealth of executives and
consequently, their work performances, changes in the tax law may have profound
impacts even on the firm value. This is a serious problem to consider in a corporate
environment, where the principal-agent relationship exists.
The present paper analyzes the effects of various tax law changes on the value
of ISOs. Furthermore, the paper investigates how ISOs differ from regular call
options, and discusses how changes in the value of ISOs can either delay or
facilitate the firm’s decision to go public through the company’s initial public
offerings.
II.

PROBLEMS TO ANALYZE

Similar to the regular stock call option, the executive ISOs grant the holder the
rights to own a prespecified quantity of company stocks at an agreed-upon (or
strike) price, in principle, at any time upon the ISO’s issuance.^ Therefore, at least
on surface, the ISO is no different from the regular calls in that both options will
have value, only if the underlying stock price exceeds the option’s exercise price.
Certain tax rules, however, complicate the ISO’s valuation unlike in the case
of the regular stock options.^ In general, no income from ISOs is realized, for tax
purposes, either upon the grant or exercise of the ISOs, until the ISO stock is
actually sold. This results in rather unusual circumstances for ISOs. For the
particular tax law governing recognizing income from the ISO stock can make the
valuation of ISOs rather unique.
III.

SOME RECENT TAX LAW CHANGES

Prior to the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, the capital gains received preferential
tax treatment, subject only to one half of the ordinary income tax rate. As a
consequence, many executives realized income from the ISO stock in the form of
capital gains. To qualify for the favorable tax treatment, however, the ISO stock was
required to be held at least for two years from the date on which the option was first
granted and at least for one year from the time of the exercise of the option.'*
One of the sweeping changes in the 1986 TRA directly affecting the employee
deferred compensation is to raise tax revenues by abolishing the special tax
treatment on capital gains, on the one hand, and on the other hand, by revamping
the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).^ Specifically, the AMT rate rose. This
affects the value of ISOs significantly.
Assuming that the ISO stock justifies exercise, it can be sold for immediate
profits* or create tax preferences’ by postponing the sale of his shares. In either case,
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tax consequences facing executives differ, especially when the taxpayer will have
to compute his taxes twice, once under the regular tax table and once under the AMT
rule, whichever is greater. Obviously, from the taxpayer’s standpoint, whether to
realize his profits immediately or to create tax preferences, or to do some of both,
became more important now than ever before with the enactment of the 1986 TRA.
To illustrate the problem, the highest individual tax rate prior to the tax reform
was 50 percent and long-term capital gains were taxed at the rate of 20 percent,
thereby establishing a spread of 30 percent. Thus, unless the tax preference item
was large enough, figuring tax under AMT did not raise the tax liabilities. Under
the 1986 TRA, however, the spread narrowed to seven percent effective 1988: the
highest individual marginal tax rates were reduced to 28 percent and the tentative
minimum income is now taxed at 21 percent.® As a result, an active use of AMT is
almost mandatory to the majority of executives with ISO stocks, warranting an
optimal tax strategy.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Individual Income Taxes and the Valuation of ISOs

Imagine that a firm has already gone public through the initial public offerings of
the firm’s securities. An executive with cash needs of X dollars in any particular
year seeks a lower AMT rate on his tax return under the present tax system.’ Typical
problems facing the executive is whether ISOs he holds should be exercised now
or at a later date in the future. This would obviously depend on the executive’s
additional cash needs for this and future periods. Had the ISO stock not been
exercised, there is no tax consequences, of course. However, if exercised in taxing
year, should they be sold for gain in the same year or at a later date? Whether or how
much to exercise and/or to sell has to be an economic decision, relative to the
executive’s inter-temporal consumption preferences. However, what is clear is that
the value of ISOs is the executive’s ability, within the present tax laws, to raise
additional income for this or any other future periods.
Let ( f = the amount of ISOs held by executives; = the quantity of the
exercised ISO stocks to be sold for an immediate gain; = the quantity of the
exercised ISO stocks to create tax preferences; and q^ = the amount of ISOs not
exercised. Then, by using mnemonic symbols,

q'"=q,+q,+q„

(i)

Assume that the taxpayer has the current consumption requirement, Y^, which
exceeds his after-tax other regular income, i.e., > (1 - t^I^, where = the ordinary
individual tax rate and/^ = the present ordinary taxable income. Then, the taxpayer
has to exercise his ISOs and sells stocks for immediate gain to meet his current
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consumption, In this circumstance his tax obligation is
+ 1^}, where
5p represents the current stock price if the firm goes public today But by realizing
income on the ISO stock, the taxpayer ends up .with a higher tax burden by the
amount of
If he creates tax preferences, his total taxable income, {qJ^S^
- E ) + /g}, is subject to a lower AMT rate, t^. If each taxpayer minimizes his tax
liability, he will choose values for q^, q^ and q^ to meet his current consumption
requirement, Y^, in taxing year. Whether he will indeed be able to do so is a function
of how many shares of ISO stocks he has and of what kind of tax liabilities he would
face as a consequence. In all circumstance, his current tax obligation, T^, under the
present IRS code, is

+

(2)

where the amount of tax preference is qt(S^ - £).
No rational taxpayer will create tax preferences to pay higher taxes than what
he could have paid had he not sought tax preference. Therefore, there must exist a
unique value of q^ exercised for each q^ exercised and immediately sold. In fact, the
unique relationship between q^and q^ can be found in equation (2). Equating the two
alternative taxes in equation (2) and solving for q^,
(3)

Substituting equation (3) into the regular tax computation in equation (2) gives the
executive’s tax liabilities as

Noting that the executive’s before-tax realized income available for consump
tion is [/g + qJiS^-E) - qJE], the after-tax available income, Y^, after exercise of his
ISOs is
+

= (1 - ',)[9,(S„ -

(5)

mtj(h - r,)}] - qf

(6)

The optimal values of q^, q^ and q^ can be found by solving equations (1), (3)
and (6) simultaneously. The results are
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l - 'oXSo - E ) 9 - E ] - y ( S , - E)

(8)

and
(9)
where 0 = tj{t^ - > 0." It is assumed that both q* and q* are non-negative, i.e.,
?s* ^
hence, (S^—E)!E a 1/0(1 —t^. Obviously, if the executive had been
granted sufficiently large amount of ISO stocks, the amount of after-tax income, Y^,
after his ISO’s exercise could have equalled his optimal current consumption, C„,
if the taxpayer wished.
The effect of tax law changes on the demand for q*, q* and q * can be seen
by differentiating equations (7) through (9) with respect to various tax parameters.
TTie result is
bq*lbtg > 0; ?iq*/bt^ < 0
^q*!btg > 0; hq*!bt^ < 0
b q ;ib tg <

0; b q ;ib t^

>

0

( 10)

Since the 1986 TRA lowered while raising t^, the above results would imply
that the tax reform will effectively reduce q* and q* but increase q*. That is,
contrary to what the TRA may have intended, incentives to exercise ISO stocks,
whether for immediate profit realization or to create tax preferences, declined. This
means less tax yield to the government, at least not from high salaried executives.
In fact, this also means that firms, run by professional managers with ISOs, will not
go public any sooner to realize the gain from exercise of ISOs.
Note, however, that the preceding discussion will hold true for a given level
of the executive’s current after-tax income, Yg. Clearly, any changes in tax laws will
also affect the level of and hence, something is missing in our analysis.
B.

Intertem poral Consumption Decision

To complete the discussion, let’s assume for simplicity that an individual is
faced with an intertemporal decision only for today and tomorrow and that his after
tax income endowment in each period is given by (1 - tg)I^ and (1 - tg)I^,
respectively. If tomorrow’s income can be exchanged for income today at the
reciprocal of (one plus) the market rate of interest, r, the executive with the ISO
stock has the intertemporal consumption opportunity boundary;
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(11)

The left hand side (LHS) of equation (11) is the amount of extra money which
must be raised to satisfy the individual’s current consumption. If LHS is borrowed,
he will pay interests and thus, including the principal, he must pay [(1 - CJ
dollars in the future periods. As an alternative, the executive can exercise his ISO
stocks to finance all or at least a part of LHS. Therefore, a rule to determine an
optimal Yp is as follows.
First, in a two -period model,

= ( l - a / , + (« ,* + « /X 5 .-£ )]

(12)

since
T, = t,{(q ; + q ;)(S ^ -E ) + I^}

(13)

Next, note that the total interest costs on the borrowing of (C„ - 7^) dollars after
exercise of ISO stocks is (1 + r)(C^ - Y^) dollars. Given the values of 7j, as in
equation (12), and Cj, however,
(c ,-y ,x i + r)= (y ,-c .)

(14)

Thus, if the RHS of equation (14) is greater than the LHS, the implicit cost of
funds, T , will be lower than the market rate of interest, r, and hence, exercise the
ISOs as much as optimally possible, i.e., use the rule as outlined in equations (7)
through (9) except that 7^ will be replaced with C^. Otherwise, borrow money in the
capital market to finance his current consumption demands. Thus, given the
definition of in equation (12), the higher the 5j, i.e., the higher the stock price in
the future, the greater the vdue of Y^ will be for any given q* and q*.
Figure 1 shows how the value of ISOs is derived in the most simplistic settings
of a two-period model. The over-time endowed income in the absence of ISOs is
denoted by the coordinate, I. Given the capital market line, the executive maximizes
his intertemporal utility fimction at C°, where his indifference curve
is tangent
to the budget line
For a consumption combination at C^, however, the
executive must borrow an amount equal to I^C^, on which he pays/jCj in the next
period. With the exercise of a part of his ISO stocks, however, he can increase his
current income by YJ^, and hence, all he has to do is borrow C^Y^ in this period.
Again, given the market interest rate of r, which is represented by the budget line
1’
pays Y 'Cj in the next period. However, with the unexercised and/or unsold
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Figure 1: Intertemporal Consumption Decision

ISO stocks, the executive has an additional income equal to Y^Y’ in the next period.
The present value of this additional income is the segment
With this additional
wealth accruing to the executive, his new consumption pair is now at C*, where his
utility is higher. Symbolically, PV(Y^ -Y ') = PV(y ;) - PV (Y') = PV(Y;) -A^ +
= PV(Y,) - [/„ + FV(A)1
= p y (y , + ( n - ^o)- Using equations (4), (5) and
(12), the value, V, of ISOs can be derived as follows:
v = p m - t o M * + qn*)(So-E)]
+ [ q ; ( S ,- E ) - q ; E - T ^ ]

(15)

It says that the value of the ISO stocks accrues to executives in two ways. First,
the amount of and q^ not only minimizes the current tax liabilities but also
provides additional income in this period without having to go into the debt market.
(See the expression in the second bracket). Second, the amount of the ISO stocks
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unexercised and/or exercised but not yet sold in this period may also enhance the
future income streams. And this has to be discounted to compute the present value
of such opportunity. (See the expression in the first bracket).
V.

THE COST OF THE ISO STOCKS

To analyze the effect of ISOs on going public, the above discussions to value ISOs
will have to be generalized to a much more realistic multi-period case. Furthermore,
since going public is not costless, the cost associated with corporations gaining a
public status will also have to be made explicit.
Let’s assume that when ISOs were granted earlier as a tax-free deferred
compensation, their fair market values were E dollars. If the stock value is expected
to decline, the ISOs would not have any value and hence, the taxpayer would have
exploited the full current value of the options. However, if the stock price is
expected to rise, the dollar value of ISOs were not being exercised can be
considered a form of investment. For this is an additional income which could have
been realized but has been foregone. Clearly, this type of investment costs q*{S^
- £) dollars. The value of the investment does not only include the regular option
values'^ but also, perhaps more importantly, the value of tax preferences the
executive can create in the future. As it were, there is in general a positive value of
“waiting” to exercise later.
On the other hand, although the ISO stocks exercised to commence tax
preferences now will not have this type of “waiting” value, the executive would
have ended up holding regular stock investments in the company at the cost of E
dollars less tax savings from the option’s exercise. This type of stock investment
can be valued in terms of the value of other regular options by using the put-call
parity relation.*"* That is, commencing tax preferences through the exercise of ISOs
is equivalent to buying a call, writing a put and lending at the risk-free rate of
interest. Since the cost of investment is q*E, the net present value of this type of
investment equals the present value of the future dividends less E dollars, i.e.,
In the meantime, the cost of going public can be seen in terms of the negative
signals that the executive sends to the investor when the ISO stocks are exercised
and sold.’^When information asymmetry exists between company insiders and the
outside investor, the sale of stocks can signal negative prospects for the company.
Thus, it is argued that the cost of going public is a possible decline in stock prices
as the amount of the sale of ISO stocks increases. This cost will be represented as
the symbol, C^, below.
VI.

OPTIMAL TIMING TO GO PUBLIC

Since both benefits and costs generated by exercise of ISOs are spread over time,
the profitability of going public is measured by its net present value, NPV„.
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Assuming that the stock price at the time of the ISO’s exercise is S^, and that the
stock price grows at some constant rate, g, the stock price, 5^, at some future point
in time, ji, is 5^=5, where 5, = S^e^\ Assuming also that the negative signalling
cost of the sale of ISO stocks is C^, the NPV“ of ISOs will be given by:

NPV.=J”

+

-[9 ,* (S ,-£ ) + 9 ,* £ + C J c -

C’

(16)
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The first two terms in equation (16) are the multi-period version of the present value
of ISOs as shown in equation (15). The last term in equation (16) is the opportunity
cost of ISOs described at the beginning of the present section of this paper. For r
> g, equation (16) can then be evaluated as
rs^-<r-g)‘
-E t+ Constant
NPV„ = ( 1 - 0 ( ^ „ - 0
L r-g
(17)

- [ ( q „ * - q ; ) ( S - E ) + T, + Y;ie-^

The value of t, t*, which maximizes the NPV^, of the ISOs, can be found by
differentiating equation (17) with respect to t and setting it equal to zero. The result
is
(18)

+E] = o /e - ^

where
«. = ( ! - '.)(4o - <!•) “ d

= [(4 / - C X S, - « ) + T, + CJ

Figure 2 illustrates the optimal timing problem for going public as the
executive seeks to maximize the NPV^ of his ISO stock holdings under the present
tax law. The LHS of equation (18) is represented by W curve reflecting the
“marginal” present value of the ISO’s future benefits with respect to time t. On the
other hand, the RHS of equation (18) represents the “marginal” cost of the ISO’s
exercise with respect to time t, and is depicted by CC curve. W curve falls much
more slowly than CC curve with respect to time, t. Assuming that the value of
is positive, an interior solution exists at the point e.
Since changes in and will shift W and CC curves, the comparative static
results will depend on the partial derivatives of equation (18) as follows:
6LHS _
------ =

-(r-g)t*

riScJi, 8RHS _ -rcboz
+ xSI--- 1 -------= rC ----

8LHS_§RHS________________
'
bta bta
“

-r/*8cj2
bta

Clearly, the partial derivatives of Oj and will depend upon the partials of
q* and with respect to the tax rates, and L. That is,
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- (- 1 )

(19.1)
8'.J

d02

— (S - £ )

<0

(19.2)

8<o 8 rJ
(19.3)
8 O7
— "— (S -E )— +
bt
^
^ . bt
bt

bt

(19,4)

Therefore, the results in equations (19) suggest that if t^ falls and t^ rises, both W
and CC curves shift upward. It seems, however, that upon careful investigation of
the above equations (19), CC curve will rise more than W curve. This means that
an optimal timing of the ISO’s exercise should occur much later than the original
equilibrium at f*.
That is, exercising the ISO stock by the firm’s going public has both its benefits
and costs. Assuming that the company’s stock value is expected to continue to rise,
the model presented seems to suggest that if decreases and increases, an increase
in the cost of the ISO’s exercise outweighs an increase in the ISO’s benefits. In the
end, the majority of firms may wish to remain private. On the other hand, if our
analysis were correct, the recent Bush Administration’s measure to raise the
ordinary income tax rates to finance the government deficits may shorten the
optimal timing for firms to go public.
VII.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The ISOs are similar to the regular stock call options. However, when one considers
various taxing laws regarding the ISO stocks, the ISOs have unique features which
can be differentiated from the regular stock call options.
In particular, a significant wealth can accrue to executives with the ISO stocks.
And the wealth can be realized when the firm goes public and when the company’s
stock becomes publicly traded. Therefore, any changes in the tax law which may
affect the financial value of ISOs can either delay or hasten the firm’s decision to
go public.
The present paper examined the valuation process of the ISOs and investigated
the economic effects of tax law changes on “going public.” The result suggests that
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in fact, the 1986 TRA may have delayed the firm’s decision to go public, while the
U.S. Administration’s recent individual income tax hike to finance the government
deficit may encourage the firm’s activity to go public. In essence, the 1986 tax law
change may have ended up penalizing executives with ISOs, thereby reducing the
incentives to go public. If going public is a vehicle to realize the employee deferred
compensation for executives and if such a vehicle becomes expensive, the structure
of executive compensation contracts may also change.
Acknowledgment: An earlier version of this paper was first presented at the Second Annual
Small Firm Financial Research Symposium, California State University, Fresno, California,
April 26-27,1990.

NOTES
1. It is well known that the incentive conflict almost always exists between the stockholders,
i.e., the principal and managers, i.e., agents. This conflict is at least partially controlled
by incentive provisions of executive compensation contracts which formally tie the
manager’s compensation to some measure of firm performance. The frequently stated
objective of these widely used provisions is to encourage managers to maximize the value
of the firm. For a general overview of these incentive provisions which are typically found
in the employee compensation contracts, see Smith and Watts (1983).
2. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Section 422A(b) spells out various requirements for the
company’s ISO plan.
3. Miller and Scholes (1982) first presented the model of the ISOs in the context of various
taxes.
4. Lavelle and Welsh (1988) argue, however, that although the 1986 TRA does seem to have
diminished the attractiveness of ISOs by abolishing the special tax treatment on capital
gains, such preferential tax treatment is not necessary to fully utilize the ISO provisions
to reap low-taxed benefits.
5. Ibid.
6. Since there is not special tax treatment on capital gains, delaying the profits till a later date
is of no relevance.
7. The Internal Revenue Code imposes a one-year holding period requirement for ISOs to
be qualified for the status of tax preferences under the AMT rule.
8. The Bush Administration has recently taken measures to raise the effective individual
income tax rates to finance the government deficit. This may negate the effect of the 1986
TRA somewhat.
9. It is assumed that a two-year statutory time limitation for ISO exercise is now up and the
current stock price exceeds the striking price.
10. It shall be assumed that > E.
11. Consider the following numerical example. Let’s assume that an executive earned in 1989
$100,000 before tax and yet has after-tax cash liquidity requirement of $110,000. He has
10,000 shares of ISOs which were valued at $5 at the time of grant. Two years have passed
since then. Today the stock price is $20 a share. Under the IRS tax code, his marginal
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individual rate is 28 percent. The AMT rate is 21 percent after the 1986 TRA. In this case,
substituting the appropriate values for 5„, E, Y^, /„ and tax rates for t^ and t^, we find that
q* = 5,377 shares, q* = 4,015 shares and q*= 608 shares. That is, when 5^377 shares of
ISO stocks were exercised and sold, his total income realized, including his other income
of $100,000, is $180,655. But he also created the tax preference of $20,075, when he
exercised additional 4,015 shares. After deducting his tax obligation of $50,589 under the
AMT rule, the executive ends up having a disposal income of $110,000, as was to be
proved.
12. Clearly, the exercise price of the option is E dollars.
13. The value of “waiting” will be henceforth referred to as the symbol, W.
14. See, for example. Black and Scholes (1973).
15. Myers and Majluf (1984) recently argued that the value of the firm may fall when new
equity issues are announced. Earlier, Leland and Pyle (1977) also argued that the value
of the firm is a negative function of the amount of equity held by the owner-managers of
the firm.
16. The result in equation (10) holds
constant. If the stock price is expected to rise
sufficiently in the future, the taxpayer would use ISO stocks to meet his current
consumption requirements in lieu of personal borrowing. Thus, 7^ in equations (7) through
(9) will be replaced with Y^. Thus, the partial derivatives of q* and q* with respect to t^
and t^ will be the same as in equation (10).
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